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John Modell
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Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., and Douglas Strong
University of Pennsylvania

INTRODUCTION

All societies are age graded to a degree and must, therefore, mak

provision for marking and sanctioning the orderly passage from one
of life to the next. The patterning of social transitions provides an un
good site from which to observe regularities of a social system over
Clearly, the ways in which such transitions are accomplished are not
features of any given society but are subject to renegotiation as soci
economic conditions change. In turn, the alteration of social schedule
itself be a source of change, bringing about shifts in other social insti
Such alterations, though sometimes subtle, are a prime subject for in
Remarkably little attention in the literature on family history has

given to the subject of transitions. Most family scholars, attemp

depict change over time, have fixed their interest on shifts in house
size, composition, and headship (Hareven 1976). In this excessive preo
tion with the organization of the household, more dynamic processe
been slighted; it is almost as though it were necessary to make the f
stand still in order to appreciate that it has changed.

Both on an aggregate and an individual level, it is easy to treat

1 The present essay develops ideas first explored by the senior authors (with
Hershberg) in "Social Change and Life Course Development in Historical Per

(1976). In turn, the latter piece was in good measure a response to questions raised
on the life course by Elder, esp. in his Children of the Great Depression (1974). Fur

(1975) and Modell (1975) have each published review essays of the Elder boo
(with Richard Rockwell) also addressed the question of marital age in a paper

at the 1975 annual meetings of the ASA. Research for the present essay was carrie

the Philadelphia Social History Project, University of Pennsylvania, with the
support of the Center for the Study of Metropolitan Problems, National Insti
Mental Health (grant MH 16621). We thank Theodore Hershberg, director of t

delphia Social History Project, for his colleagueship and scholarly involvement dur

writing of this paper. We wish also to thank, for thoughtful readings, Georg
Saundra-Lynn Coulter, Glen Elder, Jr., Sara Evans, Claudia Golden, William
our colleagues at the Russell Sage-AJS conference, and two anonymous reader
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The Timing of Marriage
such as marriage, birth, death, or any important status transition as if they

occurred in isolation. Status transitions only take on meaning, however,
when they are placed in a social context, as significant moments in "the
persistent organic interdependency of the cohort-specific life history"
(Ryder 1965, p. 290). The approach we adopt begins by observing regularities in the timing of human events, and ultimately seeks to account for the
sequencing of these events in the life span.2 Thus, for example, to make sense

of conjugal timing?as we shall try to do in this paper?we must examine
the distribution of conjugal careers of age peers. Earliness or lateness of
marriage are terms that acquire meaning only when individuals are examined
in the context of a particular cohort, or when one cohort is seen in the light
of the experience of other cohorts.
There is another sense in which the examination of conjugal timing must
be viewed in a social context. The timing of marriage can best be understood

when it is related to other status transitions which typically follow or
closely precede the entrance to matrimony. A shift in marriage age is a
relatively trivial finding unless this change is seen in the context of the
timing of other events in the familial career such as entrance to the labor
force, establishment of a household, or first birth. Rather than looking at

marriage age as a separate demographic or psychological phenomenon, we
view it as one feature in the allocation of roles to members of a cohort and
in the construction of the life course of the constituents of this cohort

(Riley, Johnson, and Foner 1972).

Placing the question of marital timing in a life-course perspective is
easier to do in theory than in practice. The historical data, and even the

contemporary data on nuptial age, do not readily fit the type of analysis we
are advocating. We are on fairly firm ground in our analyses of the distribu?
tion or variation of marriage age over time, but when we take up the rela?
tionship of marriage to other life events the data do not always carry us as

far as we might like. Our ideal end?to establish changes in the social con?
struction of familial "careers" among the members of successive cohorts
can only be approached by stretching the historical data to (and perhaps in
some instances beyond) its limits. Experience is longitudinal, but both

population lists and event lists are rarely in longitudinal form. Our contrived
life-course analysis suggests where true longitudinal work might profitably
begin, for the meaning of "timing" is visible only when conceived as part of
a career and these careers as characteristic experiences of cohorts.

This temporal or life-course perspective, we believe, offers distinct
advantages to social historians. First, by observing how individuals re-

2 We detect a similar strain emerging as well in the area of stratification studies. Haller and
Portes (1973, pp. 53 and 55), e.g., note that research in this field has turned from single
attribute "mobility scores" to the study of "the process of stratification" and that therefore
"a theory of status attainment . . . must . . . take into account possible changes occurring
in the structure of status systems."
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sponded to particular constraints and options at critical junctures in their
life courses, we have some basis for assessing their preferences and predilec-

tions. In so doing, we may gain some sense of how individuals actively
responded to changing opportunities. Second, shifts in the construction of
the life course themselves become an impetus for institutional change. As
alterations occur in the sequence or timing of life events, other features of
society must often be modified accordingly. The timing of marriage, to cite

the example we shall explore in this paper, is not merely a reflection of
institutional change but a source of change, instigating economic and social
innovations (e.g., the provision of married-student housing by universities).
Our principal objective in this paper is to illustrate the value of examining
historical data from this perspective. Our analysis follows a stepwise pro?
cedure, building out from simple constructs (the transition to marriage) to
more complex ones (family formation). Substantively, we shall attempt to

show that a significant transformation has taken place in the process of
family formation over the past century. The data with which we establish
these trends will not permit us to explain with any degree of precision why
changes occurred when they did, but the coincidence of events will suggest
some possible interpretations.
Our analysis divides into two parts. The first, a descriptive section depict-

ing nuptial trends over the past century, will present data not new to
scholars in the field, although sometimes we have organized this material
in novel ways. In the second part of the paper, we will show how the changes
in nuptial timing which occurred in this century reoriented the whole process
of family formation. This discussion will lead us to some plausible ways of
interpreting the emergence of the more contemporary pattern of family
formation, interpretations we hazard at the conclusion of our essay.
Patterns of Marriage Timing
Though marriage age has long been a topic of speculation in the literature
of family sociologists, few scholars took the trouble to assemble quantitative
materials from earlier times before Monahan's pioneering though somewhat

chaotic study of the subject in 1951. Monahan took previous observers to
task for their tendency to treat marriage age as a simple function of indus?
trialization and urbanization. Drawing upon the existing data at the time
which could be extracted from federal, state, and local censuses, and from
state and local vital registration systems, he came to the conclusion that
age at marriage in the early United States was essentially the same as
in 1890, when U.S. census data on marital status began to permit closer
scrutiny.3 Glick (1957) and his collaborators (Carter and Glick 1970) and,
3 The evidence that Monahan uses is quite varied and subject to a variety of biases. We
have subjected one of the more substantial sets of these data to a more refined analysis
than Monahan was able to perform. A close examination of the Michigan and New York
S122
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independently, Jacobson (1959) have generally buttressed Monahan's
interpretation of the historical record. The work of these scholars indicates
that neither rapid nor sustained long-term changes in median age at marriage
occurred until the 1940s.

Table 1 abstracts the marriage experience of U.S. birth cohorts dating
to the mid-19th century, drawing from successive census reports. Table 2
presents similar information from single-year periods of first marriages in

Massachusetts over roughly the same period. The cohort reports (if we
TABLE 1

Median, First and Ninth Deciles, Spread of First Marriage, and
Estimated Proportion Ever Married for Cohorts Born

1865-1874 to 1925-1934, United States

Sources.?Marital status by sex and age data from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1913, 1922, 1933a, 19436,

1953a, 1964a, 1972).
* Includes extrapolations into future.

state censuses for 1854-55 and 1874-75 strongly indicates that the urban/rural and east/
west variations in age at marriage (derived from proportions married in age-standardized
populations) existed in the 1850s as in the 1870s and, as can be systematically observed, in
the 1890 federal census. But there are no trends whatever in these years, except what is
owing to an occasional tendency in Michigan toward more even sex distributions and thus
more effective marriage markets. The period of early industrialization, thus, saw none of
the shift in marriage patterns that had been inferred from literary sources. There are

suggestions?again confirming Monahan?that this finding of basic stability can be

pushed back even further to 1825, based on the analysis of age-standardized proportions
of women married in three decennial New York state censuses, 1825 through 1845 (see
References for details of census sources). We do not preclude the possibility of cyclical
variations during the 19th century similar to those described by Katz elsewhere in this
volume, but the available data seem to show no secular trend during the early phase of
industrialization in the United States.
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assume a closed population) may be viewed as a rough proxy for longitudi?

nal data. The period data on marriages, on the other hand, depict all the
first-marriage events taking place in a single year. As such, they are subject
to considerable variation from year to year as the population of marriers
changes in size and composition.4 Despite the very different basis of the two
TABLE 2

Median, First and Ninth Deciles, and Spread of
First Marriage, Selected Years
1867-1971, Massachusetts

Sources.?First marriages by age from Massachusetts, Vital Statistics (various
years).
* Cannot be calculated since 10th percentile falls in lowest tabulated age group.

4 The reader should be aware that an effective national marriage registration system was
not created in this country until the 1950s and even then published less rich data than did
some of the states and localities. Massachusetts developed the first adequate state registra?

tion system, for all vital events, in the United States and was one of the few states to
S124
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tables, the gross cohort patterns evidently outweigh annual variation, and
the two tables yield approximately the same picture?a remarkable stability
in age at marriage during all but the most recent part of the past century.
The post-World War II drop in marriage age reveals a magnitude of change

which the slow and measured decline prior to 1920 in no way approaches.
Finer calculations probably would show some amount of fluctuation of
the median, but the overall pattern of long-term stability is hard to dismiss.

This pattern is especially noteworthy in view of the enormous social and
economic transformation that occurred in the late-19th and early-20th
centuries. Massive immigration, westward population movement, and both
urban and industrial growth left surprisingly little trace on the age at mar?
riage of both males and females during this period. Rather than long-term

developments in the economy or composition of the population gradually
bringing age of marriage down, it was the widely publicized marriage boom
of the 1940s that did so, at an unprecedented rate.

Not only did the period after World War II mark an abrupt decline in
marriage age, but it signified another important departure in the timing of
marriage. Although in theory the ages at which members of a birth cohort
marry could scatter in an infinite number of ways, in fact the distribution
assumes a probabilistic form. The shape of this marriage curve is determined

by at least two independent parameters, namely, the initial age at which
transition to marriage commences for the cohort and the proportion of those

who ever wed (Coale 1971; Hernes 1972).5

When one examines marriage spread?the amount of time it takes a
cohort to achieve its maximal proportion ever married?it is clear that an
important change has taken place since the 19th century.6 Eliminating the
provide first-marriage data for the 19th century. For these reasons, we, like others using

state statistical materials for historical inquiry, rely heavily upon Massachusetts even
while recognizing its atypicality in degree of industrialization and in some demographic
features. Period data which are weaker both conceptually and in coverage are introduced
for a very particular reason. We wish to show that the changes in marriage patterns which
we describe were neither peculiar to a single region nor merely a function of a complicated
population redistribution. We also wish to establish that the timing of the changes is so
striking that the points of inflection can be seen in records of marriage events as well as
in the marital statuses of individuals. We are looking for trends, not exact measures of
levels; and the two data sources ought on the whole to agree, their testimonies to reinforce
one another. In the case of age at marriage, the Massachusetts data are also supported by

various data from New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Michigan, all cited by
Monahan, and by materials from Philadelphia which we were able to examine in con?

siderable detail.

6 Coale (1971) assumes the independent "setting" of minimum marriage age, and age for
completion of the marriage process, for a given cohort. Hernes's (1972) alternative model
for the nuptial process would express our observation as an increase in the initial marriageability, offset by an increase in the deterioration of marriageability with age.
6 The measure is described more fully elsewhere (Modell et al. 1976). In essence, we are
applying techniques of interpolation from grouped data, that might be used for computing
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two extreme tails?the youngest 10% to marry and the oldest?in the 19th
century, it took 15 or more years for 80% of the men who ever wed to marry

and roughly 12 or 13 years for the same proportion of women to enter
wedlock. Recent data show that there is now much less variation in the age

at marriage. The central 80% of the 1925-34 birth cohort of male evermarriers managed the transition in 8.6 years, and the females did so even

more rapidly. Table 3 shows the proportion of all marriages which are
achieved in the top three modal years of age for the marriage of successive
cohorts. These figures provide further corroboration for the conclusion that

modality in marriage timing has markedly increased for both men and
women, though the changes among the males are again more dramatic
(Ryder 1969).
The data presented in tables 1,2, and 3 not only establish that modality
has increased over time but they also help to pinpoint when this change took
place. Marriage age did not become more narrowly bounded until after the
Second World War, despite the gradual lowering of the median age before
1920. But there was a sharp reduction in the spread of marriage for both
sexes in the late 1940s. This trend, of course, corresponded to the conspicuous
drop in marriage age which we noted earlier. Up to that point, there had
been a remarkable degree of constancy in marriage spread during the previous
half century. Although it is difficult to bring the figures up to the recent
TABLE 3

Proportion of all Marriages Contracted through Age 34 Attributable
to Three Most Marriage-Prone Years of Age for Single-Year

Birth Cohorts 1885-1935, United States
% Marriages?through Age 34,
Encompassed in Three Top Years Top Three Years of Marriage
Year

Birth

1885.
1890.
1895.
1900.
1905.

Male

24.1
27.3
28.2
27.6
28.1

Female

28.4
27.6
27.4
30.9
30.3

of-

Male

22,24,25
22,23,24
22,23,25
21,22,23
22,23,24

Female

19,20,21
19,20,21
18,19,20
19,20,21
18,19,20

1910. 25.7 29.1 23,24,25 18,19,20
1915. 28.5 28.9 22,23,25 19,20,21

1920. 21.6 32.5 21,22,23 20,21,22
1925. 38.4 34.2 21,22,23 18,21,22
1930. 33.7 37.6 20,21,22 18,19,20

1935. 35.7 38.8 20,21,22 18,19,20

Sources.?Retrospective data on age at first marriage by
the Census (1966, 1973ft).

a median, to compute the point of the first and
is taken to be the highest proportion ever ma
and Carter and Glick 1970) has on several occas
marriage as a spread measure but has made lit
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present because more recent cohorts have not yet completed their marriage
transition, there is no reason to believe that the change after World War II
was short-lived. Both recent registration figures from Massachusetts and

estimates of nuptial timing based on Current Population Surveys suggest
that the high degree of modality continues, slightly modified, even though

marriage age has started to climb. Apparently, the marriage spread for
females has increased somewhat during the past decade (though it is still
far below its prewar level). For males, marriage spread has remained quite

stable (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975).
When we look more closely at the figures presented in table 2, the compo?

nents of the trend toward modality are immediately apparent. After the
war, little change occurred in the age at which the first tenth of the age
cohort married, but a vast amount of change took place in the behavior
of the later deciles. Generally, the "late" marriers entered matrimony
much earlier than had been the case in previous eras. Except for a few
stragglers, the market virtually closed down for women after their midtwenties, and for men by their late twenties. There was a rapid disappearance of eligible bachelors in their thirties, and spinsterhood, the point
when women are at an age disadvantage in the marriage market, appears
to have come earlier in recent times. The distribution by age and sex of the
single and the currently married populations shows dramatically the virtual
disappearance of a once-significant part of the population?the single adult.
At the same time, the age structure of the married population has shown
remarkable stability, owing to the offsetting effects of marriage age and
mortality.

Initially, the "marriage rush" which began in the early 1940s affected
single people of all ages in much the same way. Marriage probabilities for

very young men and women increased especially markedly in the early
postwar period as compared with 1940. But even for those who did not
marry young, the probabilities of marriage at a later age increased.7 The first

phase of the marriage rush, then, reduced the spread partly by giving a
special boost to young marriers and partly by simply increasing the propor?
tion marrying at all ages including the young. This had the effect, in view of

their already relatively high marriage probabilities, of removing eligibles
from the marriage market at an earlier point in the life span. At the same
time, however, there was no backing away from marriage by the depleted
single remnants of the older cohorts.

By the end of the 1950s, a new pattern emerged: while the annual proba?
bilities of marriage for both sexes were still rising, the marriage market
7 These statements are based on the probability-of-marriage tables (with decrement for
death) for 1940 and 1948 compiled by Jacobson (1959). The 1940 table shows a general
increase in marriage probabilities over GrabilPs (1945) table representing the experience
of the 1920s and 1930s rather than a shift in the age schedule of probabilities.
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soured for older singles?men and women in their mid-twenties and older?
even though proportions remaining single throughout the reproductive span
declined.8 The postwar pattern of more modal marriage, initially a function
largely of generally heightened probabilities of marriage, was now reinforced
by a new age-specific marriage schedule. Older marriage probabilities became

somewhat depressed, absolutely, even as younger singles increased their
marriage probabilities. Viewed from a life-course perspective, marriage is

always something of a segregation process: those who by a particular age
fail to marry find their subsequent chances of ever marrying narrowing
each year. Between the postwar rush and the end of the 1950s, this selective
process became even more pronounced.
Along with the greater degree of uniformity in the marriage timing of
individuals came a greater degree of coordination of marriage age between

couples. This more or less follows from what we have seen above. As the
spread narrowed for both men and women, it might be expected that age
difference among couples would drop. Unfortunately, extensive historical
data on single-year age-at-marriage differences among couples do not exist.
Some fragmentary data reported by Monahan do support the assumption

that age homophily in marriage rose in the 20th century. Massachusetts
data, presented in table 4, show some movement in the average relationship
TABLE 4

Means and Standard Deviations of the Ages of

Brides of First-Time Grooms Marrying at Ages

20-24 AND 25-29, MASSACHUSETTS, 1871-1963

8 Cf. Jacobson's 1948 table to the one for 1958-60 constructed by Saveland and

(1969). Differences in compiling procedure do not affect our generalizations. Retros
sample data, from a later survey of economic opportunity, which are somewhat un
seem to suggest that in the early 1960s there was a collapsing toward modality
the young and old ends of the marriage period (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1970).
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between the groom's age at first marriage and that of the bride. But the
clearest trend is once again seen after World War II, when grooms in the

modal age category (20-24) seemingly selected younger brides and with
declining frequency chose brides in older age categories, upsetting what had
been a rather stable 19th-century pattern. At this point, too, began a steady

decline in the standard deviation of the ages of brides who married this
modal set of grooms. The process to matrimony now linked mates more
nearly similar in age, and did so more uniformly. The increasingly narrow
range of brides' ages was, one suspects, a reflection of the changing social
settings in which mates were being discovered (school being the most obvious
of these).9 At the same time as a shift was taking place in the site of the

marriage market, the market itself was becoming more homogeneously
age graded.
Thus far, we have located several important dimensions of nuptial timing

and have observed their change over time. Most of the remainder of the
essay will be devoted to investigating the marriage transition in the context
of other alterations that were taking place in the whole sequence of family
formation. Examining the more complex sequence of family formation will

help to elucidate the social meaning of changes we have already observed
and may offer certain insights into how and why changes in the nuptial
patterns came about.
Structural Contexts of Marriage
The argument that will unfold in the following sections is briefly that there
has been a relaxation of constraints upon the ability to marry that allowed

the timing of marriage to become increasingly preferential. People have
become relatively more free to marry according to preference because
structural conditions impose fewer obstacles to matrimony than was once

the case. What we have termed "structural" conditions range from the
largely extrafamilial and impersonal forces of a marriage market to the
very private and personal decisions such as the practice of birth control.
Under the rubric of "structural" conditions we include, too, changes in

the economic situation of young adults. There is no question that the extraordinary productivity of the United States is connected in some way to its

marriage patterns, which by comparison to countries in Western Europe
have always been highly youthful. But the commonsense idea that nuptial
timing responded directly to an increasingly productive economy is mistaken.
The historical record belies any simple translation of gains in productivity
9 RockwelPs examination (1976) of educational homogamy indicates that for nonwhites
the strongest tendency away from "random mating" (with respect to educational attainment) occurred shortly after World War II, but that for whites it was a prewar product,
after which it declined slightly, before eventually stabilizing. This trend is over and above
whatever increased age grading was occurring in educational institutions.
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into more youthful or uniform marriage. Thus, productivity gains in the
late-19th century, and the bursts of rapid improvement in disposable income

per capita (Long 1960; U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 1973), scarcely
budged marriage timing. At the beginning of the 20th century, age at mar?
riage declined during two decades of considerable economic growth and then
leveled off. But these trends correspond poorly to the inflexible patterns of
marriage modality. The war quinquennium was, of course, one of spectacular
economic advancement; but it was followed by five years of real decline in
disposable income. Only after 1950 or so did the improvement in disposable
incomes per capita again increase. Our contemporary timing patterns were
established during a period of relative stagnation in the immediate postwar

period but have declined relatively little during two decades of rapidly
expanding personal resources.

The Marriage Market
Material conditions are not the only structural constraints to contracting
marriage at the moment one chooses. One needs to find a suitable mate, and

opportunities for courtship vary according to social setting. A way of
visualizing these settings is as a marriage market. The demographic charac?
teristics of the participants in the market, the cultural rules prescribing the
range of suitable matches, and the geographical extensiveness of the market
pool together affect patterns of nuptiality. Many individuals, when marriage
markets were not very orderly, may have married late because they were

unable to find expeditiously a mate they considered suitable (Groves and
Ogburn [1928] provide an early empirical examination of marriage markets
in the United States). We will only adumbrate here the complex process by
which marriage markets became more efficient, confining ourselves to the
changing demographic balance in marriage markets. We suspect, however,

that in other ways, too (ethnic intermarriage is an example), market inefficiencies have declined over time.

Table 5 presents indicators of the pace of marriage for a sample of 37
nonsouthern states. (We have excluded those states with heavy concentrations of rural blacks so as not to complicate our task of identifying ineffi-

ciencies in the marriage market.) In this table we selectively highlight
primary marriage ages, citing the proportion of males married at 20-24 and
25-29 years and of females married at 20-24 years. The table displays the

data (means and standard deviations for each age group) for 1890, 1920,
1940, and 1970. The year 1890 is the earliest point when data on marital
status became available on a national level and is also the beginning of the

slow secular decline in age at marriage; 1920 marks the period when this
gradual decline abates; and 1940 marks the last prewar census date. Finally,
1970 brings the story reasonably near to the present. The figures, the reader
S130
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should recall, are means based on state figures. They do not assign different
weights according to the total population of the 37 states but, rather, treat
the states themselves as units.

In our analysis we employ an age-specific sex ratio for the peak marriage

ages (males 25-29/females 20-24) as a crude indicator of local marriagemarket variations. Surely, various refinements could be made in this measure,
but it has the virtue of simplicity, and our objective here is merely to identify

significant trends.10 For each sex, the ratio reveals local bulges in the popula?
tion owing to domestic and international migration and, thus, the basis for
local variation in sex ratio.

Table 6 presents for dates between 1890 and 1970 the Pearsonian correla?
tion coefficients between the proportions of ever-married males 25-29 and
females 20-24, and between both of these proxies for the pace of nuptiality
and the age-specific sex ratio. In 1890, the sex ratio was strongly correlated

with the marriage probabilities of both men and young women: in states
where men dominated the ratio, women were more prone to young marriage

and the men were less prone. Although other local causes undoubtedly
promoted positive correlations between the marriage proneness of the two
sexes, these were outweighed in 1890 by marriage-market imbalances, and
the correlation between male and female proportions married was signifi?
cantly negative. By 1920, this correlation had become weakly positive. The
effect of sex-ratio variation upon marriage had diminished for both sexes,
and other local conditions affecting marriage now prevailed. By 1940, this

covariation was highly significant, and male marriage age was no longer
correlated with the sex ratio, although the female marriage age still was. In
attenuated form, this pattern persisted to 1970.
Over time, the structural consideration of sex imbalances in local marriage
markets ceased to be a factor in the "decision" of when to marry. We may
well ask whether the disappearance of this once-potent factor was owing to
a general homogenization in state sex ratios.11 There is, in fact, an unmistakable decline in the variance of the sex ratios (both in the 37 states as well

as in large U.S. cities). The standard deviation of the state sex ratios was
0.538 in 1890. It was more than halved to 0.155 by 1920, halved again by
1940 to 0.073, and was a mere 0.047 in 1970. A regression analysis indicates
10 Existing census materials would permit the computation of nonmarried sex ratios
separately for native white, foreign-born white, and black populations (to reflect the
segregation of marriage markets), with attention to urban/rural market segregation.
Such refinements are perhaps premature before research on changes over time in the

operation of marriage markets.
11 To make sure that the pattern of observed state-to-state relationships was not entirely
a function of small states with unusual population and marriage configurations, we exam?
ined the numbers of people in states lying beyond the 1 SD point for sex ratio and pro?
portions married. Indeed, the 1890 outliers on the high-sex-ratio, low-male-marriage side

were generally sparsely populated Western states. But from 1920, the extreme states
took in large populations, who were affected by variations in the workings of the marriage

market.
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The Timing of Marriage
that, up to 1940, this decline alone can explain the diminishing impact that

sex-ratio imbalances had on age at marriage. However, more recently, in
1970, what little local variation remained in sex ratios no longer produced
the effect on marriage age that would have been evident even a generation
ago.

The basis for "decision" about marriage timing has changed, then, from
involuntary to preferential, from a structurally constrained to an individually

determined basis. Yet, the rationalization of the marriage market?at least
as we have measured it here?had not led before World War II to a contrac-

tion of marriage spread. If, as literary evidence would lead us to expect,
most people wished to marry in their early and middle twenties,12 why did
not modality increase when marriage markets seemingly permitted more
uniformity? We have only some possibilities to offer. One is suggested by the
pattern of annual variation in nuptiality over the past century. Cycles were
more placid in the late 19th century than in the early 20th, even before the

extreme swings of the Great Depression (U.S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare 1971, pp. 2-3). Postponements of marriage may
have become more common in the early-20th century when economic
prospects were favorable, resulting in a greater marriage spread. Alternatively, the "new immigration,, may have imposed a greater degree of market
segregation than had previously existed.

Changes in the Relationship of Marriage and Headship
As the traditional marriage-market effects on marriage age declined, other
determinants replaced them. Part of the evolution toward this new pattern
in the postwar period involved an altered relationship between the timing
of marriage and other related transitions. The new basis for nuptial timing
is part of a general reorganization in the sequence of family formation which
begins with the relationship between marriage and household headship.

If we assume, as a casual examination of contemporary data might
suggest, that the marriage transition implies a simultaneous transition into
independent household status, we will miss an important element of histori?
cal change in family formation. While it is true that the greatest part of

the timing of headship can be explained, at least in a statistical sense, by
marriage, the two transitions are conceptually distinct. The extent to which
there has been a pause between the two transitions has varied considerably

over time. Though today they are usually accomplished simultaneously,
even now a brief pause often separates marriage from headship.
12 This statement is based on an examination of late-19th-century popular fiction, newspaper writing, marriage manuals, and sermons, carried out by seminar students in 1975.
None of these sources suggested that marriage ought to be deferred beyond the midtwenties for women or beyond the late-twenties for men.
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Table 7, reporting headship status over time, displays census data for
1890 through 1970. The figures reveal a gradual movement toward house?

hold formation at younger ages. Household headship became more nearly
universal for the 35-44-year-old males, markedly more common for those
at the most common marriage ages between 25 and 34, and not so rare as

once for the young men between 15 (or 14) and 24. In the most general
terms, this pattern resembles the trend toward younger marriage.13
The two transitions were, however, far from perfectly related. In fact, age
at marriage declined considerably more sharply than did age at headship,
which seemingly was less flexible. (It may well be that in discussing headship
we are also in an indirect way talking about the provision of housing, and
housing is dependent on a wide variety of supply factors quite apart from

demand.) By juxtaposing the headship and marriage rates we can derive
an estimate, shown in table 8, of the minimum proportion of married men
at given ages who were not yet household heads. The actual proportion was
TABLE 7

% Males Household Heads, by Age, United States, 1890-1970
Age

1890

1930

1940

1950

1960

1970

14(15)-24*. 9.0 11.4 10.6 14.7 16.3 16.2
25-34.

25-29.

57.8

62.4

49.4

N.A.

62.2

69.4

76.5

77.7

54.2

63.2

N.A.

N.A.

30-34. 67.2 N.A. 70.7 75.9 N.A. N.A.
35-44. 77.8 80.3 79.5 81.2 85.8 86.4
Sources.?For

Census

1933a)

1890

and

and

age

1930,

age

distributions

Census 1933c). For 1940 and
19436, 1953a, 1964a, 1973a).

later

distribution
of

male

years,

hou

hous

* 14-24 from 1950.

TABLE 8

Minimum Percentage* of Currently Married Men Not

Household Heads, United States, 1890-1970
Age 1890 1930 1940f 1950 1960 1970

14 (15)-24t. 5.0 20.9 24.2

25-34. 6.0 8.8 10.7
25-29. 6.2 ... 13.6
30-34. 5.8 ... 8.3
35-44. 3.9 1.5 3.6
Sources.?Same as tables 1 and 7.

* Assuming that there are no unmarried household heads.
f Married and spouse present.
t 14-24 from 1950.

13 A discussion of patterns for females here would be redundant insofar as it relates to ou
main argument, and considerably complicated owing to the tendency of widows to live in
sub- or secondary families within households headed by others.
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somewhat higher.14 If anything, temporary coresidence of married children

with parents?the extended household?was more likely in the first half of
the 20th century than at the end of the 19th. Much of the pattern in 1950,
of course, can be explained by the housing shortage which persisted until
well after the end of the war. But this does not explain its persistence in
1930 and 1940. As late as 1950, many young men were knowingly marrying
into extended family situations, however temporary.
Because table 8 shows minima only, we present in table 9 the figures we
can derive for the actual proportion of married men who were not household
heads. As the estimates have led us to expect, the 19th-century pattern of a
looser timing relationship between marriage and headship persists halfway
into the current century. In more recent years, a far more precise sequencing
predominates. The postwar pattern, to be sure, reflects previous preferences

which often had to be held in abeyance for lack of resources. The 1940
census materials (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1943e, p. 33) show convincingly
that among the segment of young marrieds the poor and unemployed most
often failed to establish an independent residence.15 Even today, some young

people who might wish to marry and establish an independent household
still cannot afford to do so. The point is that now far more than in previous
times the two transitions are supposed to be timed together.

Since at least 1940, then, marriage not closely followed by headship
attainment was generally a product of an insufnciency of resources on the
part of newlyweds. This led us to suspect that the increasing coordination of
TABLE 9

Percentage of Married Men Who Are Household Heads,
Philadelphia, 1880, and United States, 1940-1970
1880

Age

(Phila.)

1940*

1950

1960

1970

14(15)-24f. Too few N.A. 71.4 79.6 83.3
25-34.
35-44.

82.9
91.2

83.9
89.4

Sources.?1880

hold,

from

86.3
91.4

92.7
95.1

Philadelphia

enumerators'

Pennsylvania;

94.5
96.3

1940

and

Bureau of the Census
* Spouse present.
t 14-24 from 1950.

col.

derive

manuscripts

later

(1943a,

years

1953a,

o

fro

196

14 In 1950, e.g., where the esti
at 25-34, the measured proport
households without yet being m
today, when such practices are

heads.

15 Data for Philadelphia and intercity comparisons in 1890 suggest that, on the other
hand, in the 19th century, where parents could afford it and where houses were large
enough, temporary coresidence after marriage was seemingly preferred by many younger
couples, at least while childless.
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marriage and headship in the postwar period might be explained by a rapid
diffusion of resources to younger segments of the population. Ideally, to

test this explanation, we would want to examine the earning capacity of
young couples over time, but income data are not available for various age,

marital, and household-status combinations. Labor-force participation,
however, can serve as a proxy for earning capacity. Our expectation was
not borne out. Labor-force participation of married household heads was
nearly universal before 1940 even among the extremely young. If anything,
the economic position of young married males has become less independent
in recent decades.

Further evidence pertaining to this hypothesis is presented in table 10,
which provides figures on the headship status of young married males who
were and who were not in the labor force. These data allow us to determine

whether the greater degree of simultaneity between marriage and household

headship was occasioned by a closer coordination between marriage and
entrance to the labor force. The table clearly shows that the tie between
marriage and labor-force participation has become less crucial than was once
the case. Regardless of their employment status, most married men today
are more likely to be household heads. The waning tie between labor-force

entry and the transition to marriage and household headship obviously
cannot be explained by a diminished need for resources. Wherewithal
surely is still required to afford an independent household. But young couples
have been able to find resources elsewhere?often no doubt from wife's

earnings but sometimes, too, from parental loans or contributions. Th
increasingly modal timing of marriage and the growing expectation of
prompt sequencing of marriage and headship required other flexibilitie
In order to achieve these ends, couples have been prepared to innovate
sometimes in ways formerly unavailable or unacceptable.
Thus, new patterns were created, and older ones disappeared. Temporary
coresidence of married couples with parents, long a source of flexibility,
TABLE 10

Percentage of Married-Spouse-Present Men Who Are Household

Heads, by Age and Labor-Force Status, United States, 1940-1970
Married Men in Labor Force Married Men Not in Labor Force
1940 1950 1960 1970 1940 1950 1960 1970

14-17. 50.3 45.7 63.4 ... 15.8 12.3 26.7
16-19.
82.3
.
72.8
18-24. 75.5 79.1 90.6 ... 42.3 66.4 77.5
20-24.
94.6
.
88.0
25-34. 95.0 90.9 97.3 98.6 64.3 78.3 91.5 94.8

Source.?Marital status by labor-force status, age, an

1963, 1973d).
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became less frequent. Once a strategy for easing the economic demands of
marriage, family extension became a mildly deviant arrangement.16 Table 11

provides an estimate of the prevalence of "doubling up" (newlyweds who
lived with their families for a time after marriage) over time. The percentages
shown are of the currently married who are living with their own parents

(both spouse present and spouse absent), subdivided into age groups. (We
can assume that the figures here should be roughly doubled if our criterion
for family extension was residence with either set of parents.) The pattern
is clear. At each point in time a relatively high proportion of the youngest
married men live with their parents. Coresidence was actually more common

in 1947 than in Philadelphia in 1880. Yet by late-19th-century standards,
coresidence was high in Philadelphia because single-family housing was
plentiful in the city. Only after 1947 did the prevalence of family extension

decline, and it declined abruptly.17

Extension, at least insofar as it has affected newlyweds, has not been a
historical constant. Whether or not we wish to regard the decline of the
practice of "doubling up" as a significant departure in the history of Ameri?

can kinship, we cannot completely ignore its implications for family life.
Even if coresidence was experienced only briefly by most people, it commonly

affected newlyweds at a critical juncture in their lives and at a time in which

significant patterns of interaction were being formed. As we have seen,
19th-century levels of extension persisted into the very recent past; and, as
with the timing of marriage, World War II marks a dividing line between an

earlier form of behavior and the one that many have come to believe has
long been with us.18
16 In this respect as in many others, black families now resemble 19th-century families in
their form and strategies. In 1970, regardless of the age of their heads, about three times
the proportion of black families as of white were extended. The stigma now attached to
this accommodation has a nice irony, considering how common it was in the white popula?

tion only a generation ago (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1973c, pp. 237-38).

17 We have three sets of data bearing upon the question of independent residence for young

couples, which include information on interval since marriage. These data are from

Philadelphia in 1880, which we will assume to stand well enough for 19th-century urban
behavior (probably on the high side of coresidence with parents); from a Current Popula?
tion Survey taken in April 1948 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1948) near the height of the

postwar marriage boom; and from the decennial census of 1970. Each shows a sharp

gradient toward independent residence as length of marriage increases. In 1948 when the
housing squeeze was intense, no fewer than one-third of all who married within the year,
of whatever age, were not yet household heads. In 1970 as in 1880, the proportions were
lower, but even for 1970 the proportions without their own households among those who
had recently married was high enough to allow us a rough guess that one in five or so
contemporary grooms live for a while outside of their own households, most typically in
extended families. The estimate we might derive from 1880 was that about one-third
experienced extension at some time. Viewed longitudinally, headship attainment is con?
siderably more complex a process than it would seem from cross-section alone.
18 Once again we owe an intellectual debt to Monahan, who in a brief note (1956) recog-

nized but made little of this historical fact.
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Marriage and Parenthood
The life-course transition marked by the birth of one's first child is closely
connected with the transitions into marriage and into independent household
status. In the timing of fertility, as in the timing of headship, added resources

?in this instance contraceptive technology?have potentially permitted a
wider range of timing choices. In the past, conception and marriage typically
TABLE 11

Percentage of Married People Living in Own Parents' Households,

by Age, Sex, and Presence of Spouse, Philadelphia,
1880, and United States, 1947-1970
1947
1880

(Civilian

(Phila.)

Population)

1970

All

Living

with

Spouse

Males:

14-17.

N.A.

18-24.
25-34.
35-44.
Females:

N.A.
N.A.
N.A.

14-17.

N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.

18-24.
25-34.
35-44.

Living

Apart

from

Spouse

Males:

14-17.

N.A.

18-24. N.A.
25-34. N.A.
35-44. N.A.
Females:
14-17. N.A.
18-24. N.A.
25-34. N.A.
35-44. N.A.

Sources.?1880 Philadelphia, same source as tab
status, age, and sex, in U.S. Bureau of the Cen
Note.?Insufficient cases are denoted by-.
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were linked closely, with either one of these events closely following the other.

The rarer of the two sequences, beginning with premarital pregnancy, no
doubt influences the timing of marriage, though it is not easy to calculate
the precise effects of premarital conceptions on nuptial timing. Premarital

sexual activity seems to have sharply increased after the Second World
War, contributing to far larger numbers of "forced" marriages (Smith
1973). The decision to marry was for quite a substantial number of marriers

preempted by earlier and less considered choice. The abrupt postwar
departure from past patterns of marriage timing thus included an element
of increased individual control over sexuality.

In the more common sequence, in which marriage precedes conception,
anticipated childbirth is a less direct but no less important determinant of

marriage timing. The expectation of prompt childbirth undoubtedly in?
fluenced the decision of when to marry. As long as the interval between
marriage and first birth was more or less fixed, there had to be greater
flexibility in the staging of transitions related to marriage. (We have already
seen how the integration of marriage and headship was eased early in the
20th century in order to "purchase" a slightly lower age at marriage.) The
20th-century emergence of flexibility in the period between marriage and
first birth drastically altered the trade-offs customarily made in the process

of family formation. In this respect, at least, the increasing availability of
contraception bears analogy to the more efficient operation of the marriage
market and the rapid expansion of available housing, both of which served
to remove preexisting structural constraints on the marriage decision, thus
making nuptial timing more responsive to individual preference.

Evidence to this effect is presented in table 12, which shows the very
large changes that occurred in the percentage of all women, 20-24 or 25-29
and married less than three years, who had given birth to at least one child.
The age groups vary together closely and change a great deal from date to
TABLE 12

Percentage of Women, by Age, Bearing First Child within Three
Years of Marriage, 1910-1970, and within One and
Two Years of Marriage, 1950-1970, United States
Age at Census 20-24 Age at Census 25-29

Married (Years) Married (Years)
Census

1-2

2-3

3

1910. N.A. N.A.
1940. N.A. N.A.
1950. 39.1 59.5
1960. 61.8 79.9

1970.

30.7

53.8

or

Less

1-2

2-3

3

or

Less

53.3 N.A. N.A. 45.9
37.7 N.A. N.A. 32.0
41.3 36.7 54.4 40.8
56.1 55.5 71.0 54.2
36.7 31.0 47.1 37.0

Source.?Retrospective

reports

on

fertility
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date. In 1910, more than half the wives 20-24 years old married less than
three years (i.e., with an average marriage duration of 18 months) had borne
a child. The likelihood, then, was for relatively rapid childbirth. The change

between 1910 and 1940 was a large one, probably indicating a more wide?
spread knowledge of contraception as well as a hesitant climate for child?
bearing in the uncertain economic setting of the depression. These factors

outweighed likely gains in fecundability. It seems at least possible, then,
that part of the prewar 20th-century decline in marriage age was due to an
increased independence of the timing of marriage from the timing of the
first birth.19

Between 1940 and 1960, a rapid shortening of the interval between mar?
riage and first birth took place, approaching the patterns set in 1910. Only
a part of this shift can be accounted for by the rising rates of premarital
pregnancy. Changing preferences seem to have dictated the rest. Given the

choice, most young married couples once again virtually merged the two
transitions. The equally rapid shift between 1960 and 1970 back toward
the 1940 pattern shows that this aspect of the larger change was a relatively
temporary phenomenon. As preferences increasingly prevail in the timing of
family building, rapid fluctuation becomes more possible and, we suspect,
more likely.

The postwar period brought a sharp decline in the median age of first
birth due in part to a much reduced marriage age for women but also, as

we have seen, to a greater proclivity for a closer articulation between
marriage and childbearing. The transformation that occurred in the age of
females at the birth of their child, and its relationship to changes in marriage
age, is shown in table 13. The increase in age at first birth between 1928 and
1948, along with the concurrent slow decline in marriage age, reflects the
TABLE 13

Median, First and Ninth Deciles, and Spread of Age
of Mother at First Childbirth, Selected Years
1917-1970, United States Registration Area
Median First Ninth

Age Decile Decile Spread

1917*. 22.8 17.1 29.7 12.6
1928. 21.9 17.8 29.4 11.6
1938.
1948.
1954.
1960.

1970.

22.4
22.5
22.0
21.1

21.3

18.0
18.1
17.8
17.5

17.4

29.9
30.4
29.9
28.2

11.9
12.3
12.1
10.7

27.1

9.7

Sources.?Age of mother at first childb
Education, and Welfare, Vital Statistics
* Based, unlike the other years, on fiv

19 We would of course prefer to co
in order to establish this point. Reg
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greater conscious delay of the first birth.20 In addition, the modality of age
at first birth had greatly increased by 1960. The transition to parenthood
was becoming increasingly age graded, just as was marriage. (Interestingly
enough, the tendency toward increasing uniformity remained strong at least
through 1970, despite the decline in the birth rate during this period, which
might well have resulted in a widening of the spread in the age at first birth.)

The postwar movement toward greater modality in the period between
marriage and first birth has two components. The first, as we have seen, is a

movement toward a more standard interval between marriage and first
birth. But a second and equally important development is the growing trend
for late and early marriers to behave similarly. Before 1940, age at marriage
was significantly related to the length of the interval between marriage and
childbirth. As is shown in table 13, in 1910 young marriers were prompter
childbearers than those who deferred marriage. The pattern disappeared by
1970.21 Predictably enough, this change took place between 1940 and 1950.
A more extensive view of the same phenomenon is shown in table 14. The

numbers represent the difference between those 20-24 and 25-29 in per?
centage of those still childless, at given marriage durations. Generally, the
differences dwindle after the war, following increases between 1910 and 1940.

Viewed from this perspective, we see that the general hesitation about
committing oneself to childbirth that obtained in 1940 did no thing to erase
the strong relationship that had been present, at least in 1910, between age
at marriage and first childbirth. Indeed, this association was strengthened
TABLE 14

Difference in Percentages Child?
less between Married Women

25-29 AND 20-24 AFTER 0-4 AND

5-9 Years of Marriage, United
States, 1910-1970
Married (Years)
0-4

5-9

1910. 4.8 6.7
1940. 5.8 10.2
1950. -3.0 4.5
1960. -2.5 4.0
1970. -3.5 .6
Sources.?Same as table 12.

20 The 1917 figure perhaps belies this observation. The data upon which the figure
however, may be faulty in that they alone are tabulated by five-year age groups. T
19th-century data that we know to exist concerning age of mother at first birth a

Michigan in 1884 and 1894. These are published in one-year age groups and show

figures closer to 1928 than to 1917.
21 We omit the youngest mothers from consideration here because so many in this c
have had premarital conceptions.
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by comparison with 1910. Prior to World War II, it would seem, the timing
of marriage set the terms of other familial events. Age at marriage was an
important career contingency, affecting the pace of the transition to parenthood. But, after the war, marriage age ceased to have a continuing effect on
the timing of parenthood. As never before, the matrimonial decision, itself,
now subsumed one's past.

Marriage and Female Labor-Force Participation
The slight decline in marriage age in the first half of the 20th century can be

seen as partially facilitated by two transformations: the continuing acceptability of coresidence with kin, and the ability and desire to delay child?
bearing after marriage. To some extent, certain components of the transition
to adulthood (independent residence, the rapid movement to childbearing)
were for a time subordinated to young marriage. Though initially a housing
shortage inhibited the establishment of uniform sequence of family formation
in the postwar period, soon a rapid expansion of the housing stock and the
continuation of a delay between marriage and first birth allowed most to
follow the trend toward more uniform marriage ages.
At least one more feature of the life course was modified, as table 15 shows,
TABLE 15

Percentage of Married Women in Labor Force by Age and

Childbearing Status, United States, 1890-1970
Age of Woman
14-19

20-24

25-29

30-34

1890:*

All:.

1920:*

2.2

(at

15-24)

...

2.5

2.4

All. 12.5 (at 15-19) 11.4 9.7 (at 25-34)

1940:f
Nonmothers. N.A. 27.3 (at 18-24) 35.9 31.2

Mothers. N.A. 6.4 (at 18-24) 8.7 8.8

1950:1

Women with no child

under 10. 31.3 (at 15-19) 54.2 53.8 49.0

Women with children
under 10.

10.4

13.9

15.3

18.2

1960:1

Nonmothers. 37.3 63.5 66.3 72.4
Mothers. 26.2 34.0 34.2 39.2

1970:t

Nonmothers.
Mothers.

43.5

26.2

71.1

34.0

72.4

34.2

66.7

39.2

Sources.?U.S. Bureau of Census (1907, 1923, 1943d, 19556, 1963, 1973d).
* Native whites of native parentage; "breadwinner" definition of labor-force participation.
f All married women with husbands present.
X All married women.

S142

This content downloaded from 165.123.108.74 on Wed, 07 Jun 2017 19:34:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

The Timing of Marriage
in the process of achieving a younger marriage age?that of married female
participation in the labor force. One striking feature of the table is the con?
stant but decreasing difference in labor-force participation between wives
with and without children. But more important as a determinant of marriage
age is the (re)invention, since 1890, of the working wife. Like the growing
gap between marriage and first birth, the possibility of employment for
married women increased the flexibility of timing choice for young people
who were contemplating matrimony. Once again, the decade in which the
transformation is most evident is the crucial World War II decade. For

20-24-year-old women, the age group in which the marriage surge wa
concentrated, an enormous increase occurred in labor-force participation,
an increase which has not subsided even to date.

Conclusion

Seen from a life-course perspective, we have argued that important features
of the 19th-century pattern of family formation in the United States lasted

at least until World War II. Despite such widely recognized changes in
family-related behavior as the gain in income per capita, the completion of
the demographic transition, the steady extension of school careers, and the
emergence of a postparental period, young men and women typically left
their parents' homes, married, and set up their families over very nearly the
same parts of their lives in 1940 as they had for the previous half-century.
During the war and in the postwar period, the timing of marriage and its
relationship to other transitions altered markedly. Once in place, the postwar
pattern itself was surprisingly persistent, though we are forever catching
distant early warnings of its cracking: widespread premarital cohabitation,
increased single parenthood among the young, a new valuation for "childless" marriage, and a return to more complex household forms. We offer no
prognostications but wish to reiterate that we have observed, using varied

and sufficiently reliable sources of data, that abrupt change followed a
relatively lengthy period of stasis. It could well happen again.
We have located a significant historical transformation in the American

family but have not provided a satisfactory explanation for the changes
which have been depicted. To do so would require a detailed chronology of
the wartime and postwar transition in marriage age, with attention to local
variations. With due appreciation for the complexities of providing this sort
of account, we shall conclude by sketching some of the considerations that

may have figured in the transformation. Our interpretation takes into
consideration both changing structural conditions and alterations in prefer?
ences in the postwar period, events which may have helped to dislodge the
pattern of family formation carried over from the previous century.

The Great Depression was severe enough and long enough that, unlike
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previous cyclicalities, the age structure of marriage was altered. Careers
were not merely temporarily delayed but were reoriented.22 Beginning with
the cepression and continuing for a decade or more, both marriage and child?
bearing generally became problematic. Perhaps half a generation of youth
thus were cut loose from traditional timing criteria, long enough for the
criteria themselves to shift.23 As early as 1940, established patterns of family

formation were breaking down as young people anticipated the outbreak
of war and the economic crest that so typically accompanies armament.
Marriage became what one commentator called "the war disease." The
reasons for this are various: some calculatively economic, some unabashedly
romantic, some involving the innovation of new patterns while pursuing the
logic of existing norms. "If we wait until the men come back after this war

lasts several years, they'11 pass us up for younger women," reasoned one
Ohio respondent to a question about war marriages. "You can depend on
it," said another. "Men just go for widows, grass or sod, better than a
chilly virgin."24

Toward the end of the war, a certain degree of uneasiness was reflected in
the family literature as to whether servicemen might have lost the necessary
"domestic skills" to maintain stability in the family. The enormous surge of

marriages in the early postwar period provided reassurance that men had
not lost their taste for matrimony. While there was an active campaign for
marriage education in the schools, the church, the home, and the office of
the marriage counselor, marriages contracted at ages that once would have
seemed too young were rarely condemned in the postwar period. Experts

expressed confidence, however, that the marriage rush was a temporary
phenomenon. They were wrong.25
We do not believe that wartime experience as such permanently changed

marriage preferences and thereby marriage practices, though it must be
regarded as at least a logical possibility. A more theoretically compelling
explanation would detail underlying structural alterations. The present
22 Bernard's (1940) perceptive treatment of the effect of the depression on age at marriage
seems to assume that the kind of change she found in the 1930s?a postponement specifi?
cally of younger marriages?was typical in cyclical movements. Our close examination of

Massachusetts, Michigan, and Philadelphia marriage-registration data convinces us of
the exact opposite: in altering the age schedule of marriage, the depression was unique

among American fluctuations.
23 As Waring (1975) indicates, one of the social responses to imbalance between roles and
available candidates is "changing the age criteria" for these roles.
24 Throughout the war, the popular literature and writings of family-study professionals
was preoccupied with the question of the desirability of war marriages, the number of
which soared, though generally sympathies ran high for the young couple who wished to
gain some measure of "personal security as the sea of crisis runs high" (Panunzio 1943;
Robbins 1944).
25 In 1946, Glick characterized the rush as a " 'borrowing' of marriages from the future"
(p. 240), while Davis (1950) soon thereafter anticipated a low marriage rate in the 1950s,
despite favorable economic prospects, "because a large portion of the' marriageable popula?
tion has been, so to speak, used up in the matrimonial marathon of the 1940's" (p. 10).
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paper cannot pretend to isolate these, but it seems likely that some combination of three dimensions are at the heart of the changing pattern of family
formation: shifts in the degree of age grading, rearrangements in the family
economy examined over the family life cycle, and new institutional bases
for life-course decisions.

Age grading in American society has tightened significantly in two
respects, both of which imply closer coordination in the timing of behaviors
(like marriage) among age peers. Despite the expansion of higher education
and the lengthening of educational careers, school departure has nonetheless

become more modal. Between 1940 and 1950 more young people stayed in
school until high school graduation and seem to have done so at a rather
more uniform age, even though the educational attainment generally became

more varied within successive cohorts during this same period (Rockwell
1976). Thus, the percentage of males, 18-20 years of age, who had ceased
their education after four years of high school was 27.5% in 1940 and 32.3%
in 1950.26 Moreover, for young men, the wartime and peacetime conscription
(or at least the possibility of it) was a powerful agency for creating cohort
self-consciousness.27 (The peacetime draft, of course, is over; the constraints
that structure lives continue to change.)

The 19th-century family economy, as we have noted, typically took a
cooperative form at various stages in the family life cycle. From one point
of view, this was no less true after World War II than before?despite the
proliferation of new families. The proportion of urban families with two or
more members in the labor force remained around 32% in 1930 and 1940,

rose to 34.5% in 1950, and then to 43.8% in 1960 and 52.1% in 1970 (U.S.
Bureau of the Census 1943g, p. 36; 1955a, pp. 2A-31; 19646, pp. 5-9; 1973e,

p. 13). A 1947 Current Population Survey inquiry into the subject showed
virtually identical distributions of husband-wife families by numbers in the

labor force in 1947 as in 1940 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1946-1947, no.
10, pp. 6-7).
Yet looked at more closely, a shift was taking place within this continuing
26 From level of education by age data and cross-sectional enrollment-by-age data (see
U.S. Bureau of the Census 1943c, 1953c).
27 The conjunction of the draft, school-departure timing, and the timing of marriage is
treated in a thought-provoking way by Winsborough (1975, 1976) in a series of unpublished

papers based on recent longitudinal and retrospective data. Winsborough speculatively
emphasizes the effects of the draft on the higher male marriage modality and greater
youthfulness in the postwar period, and argues that cohort-by-cohort variation in this
period can be explained by the effects of cohort variation in military service, working
through age-specific probabilities of marriage in and out of the service. This, Winsborough
suggests, can have operated virtually independently of any changes in preference. Indeed,
Winsborough's model fits the postwar period rather neatly, despite its exclusive focus on
male experience. We doubt, though, that it could alone explain the sharp transformation
which took place in the decade of the forties. Indeed, the age-specific marriage patterns
Winsborough's model presupposes are postwar, and are themselves products of the melodrama and underlying structural changes we are discussing.
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facade of economic collaboration. We suspect that this change reflected and
in part contributed to the demarcation of generational units. Specifically,
married women participated in the labor force, as it were, in place of children,

who now stayed in school longer, or left their families of orientation to
establish their own households. Comparing young adult participants in the
labor force in 1940 and 1950, we find two dramatic shifts. The number of
single male relatives of heads 18-24 (typically sons) who worked was about
halved in the decade, while the number of young working wives more than

doubled. The increase of working wives, as we have seen, was directly
associated with earlier establishment of household headship.

These patterns are quite complex, and no descriptive account?certainly
not one so sketchy as ours?can untangle the labor-market and familyeconomy considerations that went into the marked reordering of priorities
reflected in these figures. The critical conclusion, however, seems unmistak-

able: a changing and again vibrant economy made available the jobs that
permitted a novel integration of work and family roles, a manifestation of
which was the postwar age-at-marriage pattern.28
A final aspect of family economy is far harder to get at but has the ad?
vantage of leading us toward institutional changes. The prewar collaborative
family depended, especially in times of distress, on the economic contribu?
tions of adult offspring, who typically remained in the home. Under postwar

conditions, however, when prosperity made young people residentially
independent at an earlier age, the direction of economic dependency may
have reversed (on net, that is, for exchanges in both directions still exist and

no doubt always have) (Hill 1970). A charming piece of historical ethnography, we suspect, would be to recreate the development (in the postwar
period, probably) of the variety of ritual falsehoods by which parents
subsidized the marriages of their children, who would have been both too
young and too dependent to marry by the standards of an earlier generation.
The overall effect of institutional change in the war decade, apparently,
was to redistribute benefits in an age-specific manner, with the consequence

of promoting earlier and more modal marriage patterns. The most obvious

of such institutional innovations were the G.I. Bill of Rights and Social
Security. The redistributions affected by both of these governmental
innovations increased decision-making flexibility and thus had an impact
28 Moreover, we suspect that not only were the performers of work roles changing in a way

that altered the pattern of family formation, but also the jobs available to young people
influenced the transition from the family of orientation to the family of procreation. The
occupations which provide stable, predictable careers appeared to increase over the 1940s
and in many cases to be available to new entrants to the labor force. This age group also
seems to have improved their average annual earnings at an especially lively pace over the
period, and these earnings improvements may well have been invested in the establishment
of independent households. Again, these observations are tentative and call for far more
intensive analysis, fortunately of data that exist in profusion (U.S. Bureau of the Census,

Current Population Survey, P-60, annually; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1943/).
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analogous to that of contraception or female employment. Each seemingly
removed barriers to marriage. The G.I. Bill essentially allowed veterans to
pass rapidly through a number of transitions which previously would have

required an extended period,29 while the Social Security System hastened
the movement away from the 19th-century collaborative family economy by
freeing young people, at least in part, from the burden of caring for their
elderly kin.30

From the perspective of the individual, the postwar period appeared to
pose fewer impediments to arranging the life course ad lib.31 As individuals
gained the resources to schedule decisions according to their own personal
timetables, they did so more uniformly than before. From the vantage point

of any cohort, at least after the immediate postwar period, life-course
choices became more modal. We do not wish to insist, however, that the
new timing of marriage inevitably bound the individual into a more determinate conjugal career than was the case in previous times. A more prescribed
course of family formation did not preclude subsequent flexibility in the

familial career. Perhaps, as Ryder (1969, p. 116) suggests with regard to
fertility, the new modality of family formation will increasingly bind cohort

histories to "questions of fluctuation rather than of trend."
In this paper we have kept narrowly to first entrance to the married state,
ignoring divorce. We suspect that our discussions of modality and timing
would have been considerably different, reversed perhaps, if our concern
were not first but final marriage. And, lest our argument create another
29 The original bill provided one year of schooling for veterans who had served 90 days and
who were not older than 25 at time of entry. In addition, it provided one year of schooling
for every year of service up to a maximum of four subsidized years. The bill provided for
payment of fees, tuition, books, and supplies, and carried a monthly subsistence payment
of $50 for single veterans and $75 for married veterans. Both payments were soon increased.
Home, farm, and business mortgages were easily and generously financed under the G.I.
Bill. Fully $14.5 billion was transferred to veterans under the various titles of the G.I. Bill,
affecting more than 7.5 million veterans (Olson 1974).
30 The influence of the Social Security System on the timing of marriage can best be seen
as part of a larger long-term shift that led to greater economic independence of older people

from those younger. Changes in intergenerational transfers are hard to document, but
beginning in about 1950 older people began to receive increasing sums from extrafamilial
sources. Expressed in constant 1966 dollars, average income for a married couple on
Social Security rose from $1,720 in 1941-42, to $1,930 in 1951, to $2,900 in 1962. At the
same time, beneficiaries who had adult children in their households declined from 34% in

1941-42 to 17% in 1957, and the proportion of recipients who also received financial
assistance from relatives and friends dropped from 11% to 3%. Private pension plans, in
general, affected increasing numbers after 1950. Both public and private plans, though
benefits were not widely distributed, were "in place" at war's end (Merriam and Skolnick
1968).
31 We are struck by the convergence of our argument with Turner's (1976) recent contribu?
tion to historical social psychology, partly because we seem to recognize different parts of

the same phenomenon coming from radically divergent perspectives. Turner suggests

that the last 20 or 30 years has probably seen an increase in our society of individuals who

recognize their "real selves" as being anchored not in institutional requirements but in
individual impulse.
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unattainable "world we have lost," just beyond our memories, of individuals
who lacked our current burden of timing marriage correctly, let us recall
that such changes are rarely irreversible.32 What we have observed, after all,
may well be but a fluctuation.
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